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Abstract	  The	  quality	  of	  electricity	  distribution	  is	  being	  more	  and	  more	  scrutinized	  by	  regulatory	  authorities,	  with	  explicit	   reward	  and	  penalty	   schemes	  based	  on	  quality	   targets	  having	  been	  introduced	  in	  many	  countries.	  	  It	  is	  then	  of	  prime	  importance	  to	  know	  the	  cost	  of	  improving	  the	  quality	  for	  a	  distribution	  system	  operator.	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  focus	  on	  one	  dimension	  of	  quality,	  the	  continuity	  of	  supply,	  and	  we	  estimated	  the	  cost	  of	  preventing	  power	   outages.	   For	   that,	   we	  make	   use	   of	   the	   parametric	   distance	   function	   approach,	  assuming	   that	   outages	   enter	   in	   the	   firm	   production	   set	   as	   an	   input,	   an	   imperfect	  substitute	   for	  maintenance	  activities	  and	  capital	   investment.	  This	  allows	  us	   to	   identify	  the	   sources	   of	   technical	   inefficiency	   and	   the	   underlying	   trade-­‐off	   faced	   by	   operators	  between	  quality	  and	  other	  inputs	  and	  costs.	  For	  this	  purpose,	  we	  use	  panel	  data	  on	  92	  electricity	   distribution	   units	   operated	   by	   ERDF	   (Electricité	   de	   France	   -­‐	   Réseau	  
Distribution)	   in	   the	   2003–2005	   financial	   years.	   Assuming	   a	   multi-­‐output	   multi-­‐input	  translog	  technology,	  we	  estimate	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  preventing	  one	  interruption	  is	  equal	  to	  10.7€	   for	   an	   average	   DSO.	   	   Furthermore,	   as	   one	   would	   expect,	   marginal	   quality	  improvements	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  expensive	  as	  quality	  itself	  improves.	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1.	  INTRODUCTION	  	  The	  frequency	  and	  the	  duration	  of	  power	  outages	  are	  the	  two	  key	  measures	  of	  quality	  that	   electricity	   distribution	   utilities	   pay	   particular	   attention	   to.	   	   Other	   than	   the	   direct	  costs	  of	  outages,	  represented	  by	  opportunity	  costs	  and	  repair	  expenditures,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  regulatory	  cost	  as	  regulators	  more	  and	  more	  impose	  bonuses	  and	  penalties	  based	  on	  service	  quality	  performance.	  This	  is	  for	  instance	  the	  case	  in	  France,	  Germany,	  Italy	  and	  the	   UK.	   To	   prevent	   outages	   and	   these	   related	   costs,	   operators	   have	   two	   main	  possibilities,	   either	   to	   increase	  maintenance	   or	   to	  make	   new	   investments,	   e.g.	   replace	  overhead	  lines	  by	  underground	  lines.	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  estimate	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  preventing	  an	  outage	  for	  a	  distribution	  system	   operator	   (DSO),	   what	   we	   call	   hereafter	   the	   shadow	   price	   of	   quality.	   	   	   This	  shadow	  price	  represents	  the	  additional	  operational	  or	  capital	  expenditure	  that	  the	  DSO	  must	   incur	   in	   order	   to	   reduce	   the	   number	   of	   outages	   by	   one.	   	   This	   information	   is	   of	  particular	   importance	   for	   regulatory	   purpose	   as	   both	   the	   marginal	   benefit	   and	   the	  marginal	   cost	   of	   supplying	   additional	   quality	   are	   necessary	   to	   determine	   the	  welfare-­‐maximizing	  level	  of	  service	  quality	  (Sappington,	  2005).	  	  	  	  To	   estimate	   the	   shadow	   price	   of	   quality,	   we	   make	   use	   of	   the	   parametric	   distance	  function	   approach.	   	  We	   apply	   the	   same	   approach	   as	   Färe	   et	   al.	   (1993)	   but	   instead	   of	  considering	   outages	   as	   an	   undesirable	   output,	   we	   assume	   that	   they	   enter	   in	   the	   firm	  production	  set	  as	  an	  input	  i.e.,	  that	  outages	  are	  an	  imperfect	  substitute	  for	  maintenance	  activities	   and	   investment.	   	   	   Therefore,	   following	  Growitsch	   et	   al.	   (2009),	  we	  postulate	  that	  the	  corresponding	  distance	  function	  is	  input	  oriented.	  	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  identify	  the	  underlying	  trade-­‐off	  faced	  by	  operators,	  between	  quality	  and	  other	  inputs	  and	  costs.	  We	  estimate	  a	  flexible	  translog	  multi-­‐output	  multi-­‐input	  technology.	  On	  the	  output	  side,	  we	   chose	   a	   specification	   that	   takes	   into	   account	   the	   main	   output	   dimensions	   of	   the	  electricity	  distribution	  activity:	   i)	   the	  number	  of	  customers;	   ii)	   the	  surface	  area	  served	  and;	   iii)	   the	   GWh	   of	   electricity	   distributed.	   On	   the	   input	   side,	   the	   three	   dimensions	  retained	  are:	  i)	  operational	  expenditures;	  ii)	  capital;	  and	  iii)	  quality,	  represented	  by	  the	  number	  of	   interruptions	  (longer	  than	  3	  minutes	  in	  duration).	   	  We	  use	  for	  computation	  purposes,	   a	   stochastic	   frontier	  approach	   (SFA)	  as	  well	   as	   a	  parametric	   (deterministic)	  linear	  programming	  approach	  (PLP).	  	  Both	  approaches	  give	  similar	  results,	  on	  average.	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With	  the	  SFA	  approach	  we	  can	  take	  into	  account	  the	  influence	  of	  random	  noise	  -­‐	  but	  we	  find	  that	  the	  monotonicity	  requirements	  are	  not	  satisfied	  for	  all	  observations.	  	  We	  have	  thus	  developed	  a	  methodology	  to	  integrate	  the	  monotonicity	  constraints	  in	  a	  simple	  and	  convenient	  way	   using	   the	   deterministic	   PLP	   approach.	   To	   estimate	   the	   parameters	   of	  the	  production	  function,	  we	  use	  panel	  data	  on	  92	  electricity	  distribution	  units	  operated	  by	   ERDF	   (Electricité	   de	   France	   -­‐	   Réseau	   Distribution)	   in	   France	   in	   the	   2003–2005	  financial	  years.	  Compared	  with	  similar	  studies,	  we	  have	  access	   to	  very	  comprehensive	  and	  comparable	  data,	  in	  particular	  on	  the	  value	  of	  capital.1	  	  	  We	  derive	  from	  the	  underlying	  production	  technology	  the	  shadow	  prices	  for	  the	  quality	  (outages),	  that	  is	  the	  marginal	  rate	  of	  substitution	  between	  quality	  and	  the	  other	  inputs.	  	  For	  France,	  the	  average	  shadow	  price	  of	  quality	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  10.7€,	  meaning	  that	  it	  costs	  the	  DSO	  an	  additional	  10.7€	  to	  prevent	  one	  interruption.	  Our	  results	  show	  that	  the	  estimated	  shadow	  price	  of	  quality	  varies	  substantially:	  from	  1.28	  €	  to	  69.2	  €	  among	  the	  DSOs.	   Furthermore,	   as	   one	   would	   expect,	   marginal	   quality	   improvements	   tend	   to	   be	  more	  expensive	  as	  a	  network	  approaches	  100%	  reliability	  i.e.	  the	  cost	  of	  quality	  function	  is	  a	  convex	  function.	  	  We	  also	  estimate	  the	  distance	  function	  elasticities	  with	  respect	  to	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  for	  each	   DSO.	   These	   elasticities	   can	   be	   used	   to	   determine	   the	   main	   cost	   drivers	   of	   the	  operators.	   	  Results	  indicate	  that,	  when	  customer	  density	  is	  low,	  the	  main	  cost	  driver	  is	  the	  number	  of	   clients	  while	  electricity	  delivered	  can	  be	   increased	  at	   little	   cost.	   	  When	  customer	  density	  is	  high,	   increasing	  the	  number	  of	  clients	  and	  the	  electricity	  delivered	  requires	  both	  a	  substantial	  input	  expansion.	  	  Finally,	  our	  models	  completely	  benchmark	  the	   French	   DSO	   taking	   the	   quality	   into	   account,	   an	   important	   exercise	   since	   the	  regulators	   have	   now	   started	   to	   use	   explicit	   benchmarking	   methods	   to	   regulate	   the	  energy	  distribution	  companies	  (see	  Farsi	  et	  al.,	  2007	  for	  a	  description).	  	  The	  remainder	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  In	  Section	  2	  we	  survey	  the	  literature	  on	   benchmarking	   analyses	   in	   electricity	   distribution	   including	   service	   quality	   while	  Section	  3	  describes	  the	  electricity	  distribution	  sector	  in	  France.	  Sections	  4	  and	  5	  present	  the	  methodology	  and	   the	  data	  used	   in	  estimation,	   respectively.	   In	  Section	  6	  we	  report	  the	  main	  results	  of	  this	  study	  and	  in	  Section	  7	  we	  draw	  some	  conclusions.	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2	  RELATED	  LITERATURE	  Most	   benchmarking	   analyses	   in	   electricity	   distribution	   have	   involved	   models	   that	  incorporate	  standard	  output	  characteristics,	  such	  as	  energy	  supplied	  (in	  GWh),	  number	  of	  customers	  and	  network	  size	  (e.g.,	  service	  area	  or	  network	   length).	  For	  example,	  see	  the	  literature	  review	  in	  London	  Economics	  (1999)	  and	  Jamasb	  and	  Pollitt	  (2001).	  Very	  few	  studies	  have	  included	  quality	  of	  service	  measures	  in	  these	  models.	  Some	  exceptions	  are	  the	  studies	  by	  Giannakis	  et	  al.	  (2005),	  Growitsch	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  Coelli	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  and	  Jamasb	  et	  al.	  (2010).	  	  Giannakis	   et	   al	   (2005)	   use	   data	   envelopment	   analysis	   (DEA)	   methods	   to	   measure	  technical	  efficiency	  (TE)	  and	  total	  factor	  productivity	  growth	  (TFP)	  in	  14	  UK	  distribution	  companies	  over	  the	  1991/92	  to	  1998/99	  period.	  The	  DEA	  method	  is	  used	  to	  estimate	  a	  non-­‐parametric	   input	   distance	   function	   that	   involves	   three	   output	   variables	   (energy	  supplied,	  customers	  and	  network	  length).	  Four	  models	  involving	  different	  input	  sets	  are	  considered:	   (i)	   operating	   expenditure	   (OPEX);	   (ii)	   total	   expenditure	   (TOTEX);	   (iii)	  number	  of	  interruptions	  (NINT)	  and	  total	  time	  lost	  due	  to	  interruptions	  (TINT);	  and	  (iv)	  TOTEX,	  NINT	  and	  TINT.	  They	  find	  that	  the	  TE	  scores	  of	  the	  various	  models	  are	  positively	  (but	   not	   perfectly)	   correlated,	   and	   that	   the	   TE	   scores	   rise	   when	   the	   NINT	   and	   TINT	  quality	  variables	  are	  added	   to	   the	  TOTEX	  model	   (a	   result	   that	   is	   to	  be	  mathematically	  expected	  when	  variables	  are	  added	  to	  a	  DEA	  model).2	  	  Growitsch	   et	   al	   (2009)	   use	   stochastic	   frontier	   analysis	   (SFA)	  methods	   to	   estimate	   an	  input	   distance	   function	   using	   data	   on	   505	   electricity	   distribution	   utilities	   from	   eight	  European	   countries	   in	   the	   2002	   financial	   year.	   Their	   models	   contain	   two	   output	  variables	   (energy	   supplied	   and	   customers)	   and	   either	   one	   input	   variable	   (TOTEX)	   or	  two	   input	   variables	   (TOTEX	   and	   TINT).	   They	   use	   the	   Battese	   and	   Coelli	   (1995)	   SFA	  model	   to	   investigate	   the	  effects	  of	   customer	  density	   (customers	  per	  network	  km)	  and	  country	   (using	   dummy	   variables)	   upon	   technical	   efficiency	   scores.	   They	   find	   that	   the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  quality	  variable	  reduces	  TE	  for	  all	  but	  the	  large	  firms,	  plus	  they	  find	  that	  the	  TE	  scores	  from	  the	  two	  models	  are	  significantly	  negatively	  correlated,	  both	  findings	  being	  in	  contrast	  to	  those	  of	  Giannakis	  et	  al	  (2005).	  Jamasb	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   estimate	   the	   marginal	   cost	   of	   quality	   improvements	   of	   12	   UK	  distribution	   companies	   for	   the	   period	   1995-­‐2003.	   For	   that,	   they	   run	   fixed-­‐effect	  estimations	   of	   the	   link	   between	   the	   cost	   of	   electricity	   distribution	   (identified	   with	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TOTEX,	  OPEX	  or	  CAPEX)	  and	  a	  series	  of	  cost	  drivers	  including	  the	  energy	  delivered,	  the	  network	  length,	  the	  network	  energy	  losses,	  the	  customer	  minutes	  lost	  and	  a	  time	  trend.	  They	   found	   that	   the	  marginal	   cost	  of	  quality	   is	  positive	  and,	  on	  average,	  equal	   to	  25.6	  pence	  per	  minute	  lost.	  This	  estimated	  marginal	  cost	  of	  improving	  quality	  is	  larger	  than	  the	  penalty	  set	  by	  the	  regulator	  for	  lower	  delivered	  quality.	  Consequently,	  the	  UK	  quality	  of	  service	  regulation	  does	  not	  provide	  enough	  incentives	  to	   increase	  the	  quality	  as	  the	  firms	   are	   better	   off	   paying	   the	   fine.	   Finally,	   the	   marginal	   cost	   of	   improving	   quality	  increases	  with	  the	  quality	  delivered,	  as	  expected.	  	  The	   above	   studies	   are	   to	   be	   commended	   for	   introducing	   quality	   variables	   into	   these	  benchmarking	  models.	  However,	  these	  studies	  contain	  some	  shortcomings.	  First,	  they	  all	  make	   use	   of	   TOTEX	   measures	   which	   contain	   capital	   expenditure	   (CAPEX)	   measures	  which	  need	  not	   reflect	   the	   actual	   amount	  of	   capital	   services	   consumed	   in	   a	  particular	  year.	   Second,	   the	   UK	   studies	   suffer	   from	   small	   sample	   size	   problems	  while	   the	   inter-­‐country	   study	   suffers	   from	   difficulties	   associated	   with	   deflating	   monetary	   values	   of	  TOTEX	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  comparable	  measures	  of	  implicit	  input	  usage	  in	  each	  country.	  	  Last,	  inter-­‐country	  comparisons	  are	  often	  unable	  to	  properly	  take	  into	  account	  country	  heterogeneity	  effects,	  such	  as	  differences	  in	  the	  perimeter	  of	  activity.	  	  	  	  In	   the	   current	   study	   we	   aim	   to	   address	   these	   problems	   by	   making	   use	   of	   a	   detailed	  database	  on	  the	  activities	  of	  92	  electricity	  distribution	  units	  operated	  by	  ERDF	  Réseau	  Distribution	  in	  France	  in	  the	  2003–2005	  financial	  years.	  	  With	  these	  data	  we	  thus	  avoid	  the	   small	   sample	   size	   problem	   and	   the	   international	   comparability	   problem.	  	  Furthermore,	  we	  also	  have	  access	  to	  comprehensive	  and	  comparable	  data	  on	  the	  value	  of	  capital	  items,	  measured	  at	  its	  gross	  value,	  so	  we	  can	  avoid	  the	  need	  to	  use	  CAPEX	  to	  measure	   capital	   input	   services.3	  	  With	   this	   unique	   dataset,	   we	   are	   able	   to	   distinguish	  three	   inputs:	  OPEX,	  capital	  and	   interruptions,	  better	  reflecting	   the	  choice	  made	  by	   the	  operators.	  	  We	  are	  thus	  able	  to	  identify	  the	  underlying	  trade-­‐off	  faced	  by	  operators	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  trade-­‐off	  between	  quality	  and	  other	  inputs.	  	  
3.	  ELECTRICITY	  DISTRIBUTION	  IN	  FRANCE	  In	  France,	  most	  electricity	  distribution	  grids	  are	  owned	  by	  municipalities,	  individually	  or	  grouped	   in	   communities.	   To	   organize	   the	   public	   service	   of	   electricity	   distribution,	  municipalities	  either	  delegate	  the	  network	  management	  to	  a	  third	  party	  DSO	  within	  the	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framework	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  concession	  contract	  or	  organize	  the	  service	  themselves.	  Most	  of	  the	  municipalities	  delegate	  the	  management	  of	  their	  network	  to	  ERDF4,	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  EDF,	  the	  historical	  electricity	  operator	  which	  is	  now	  publicly	  listed	  company	  but	  with	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  shares	  owned	  by	  the	  French	  State.	  ERDF	  covers	  more	  than	  95%	  of	  the	  territory	  while	  the	  remaining	  part	  is	  covered	  by	  local	  public	  companies.	  	  	  The	  concession	  contracts	  define	  the	  rights	  and	  obligations	  of	   the	  distributor	  regarding	  quality	  of	  supply,	  customers’	  connections	  and	  environmental	  conditions.	  Public	  service	  requirements	  are	  the	  same	  all	  over	  the	  country	  and	  the	  contracts	  follow	  a	  similar	  model.	  The	  DSO	  is	  remunerated	  by	  the	  tariff	  applied	  to	  final	  users,	  which	  is	  supposed	  to	  cover	  operating	   costs	   and	   investments.	   This	   tariff	   is	   the	   same	   for	   all	   the	   concessions	   (one	  single	  price	   for	  all	   the	   customers	   in	  France)	  and	   for	  all	  DSOs.	  The	   rates	   for	   the	  use	  of	  public	   electricity	   grids,	   including	   transmission	   and	   distribution	   networks,	   are	   set	  periodically	  by	  the	  French	  Regulator,	  the	  CRE	  (Commission	  de	  Régulation	  de	  l’Energie).	  ERDF	   has	   organized	   its	   network	   in	   93	   local	   distribution	   units.	   These	   units,	   known	   as	  
Centres,	   are	   grouped	   in	   23	  URE	   (Unité	  Réseau	  Electrique)	   and	   further	   aggregated	   in	   8	  regions.	  During	  the	  sample	  period,	  Centres	  were	  autonomous	  (within	  limits)	  for	  taking	  decisions	   regarding	   capital	   and	   operational	   expenditures.	   In	   2006,	   the	   company	   was	  reorganized	   and	   the	   decision	   making	   powers	   moved	   to	   the	   URE,	   with	   the	   Centres	  remaining	  as	  administrative	  units.	  	  Quality	   of	   electricity	   distribution	   has	   multiple	   aspects:	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   commercial	  service,	   the	   voltage	   quality	   and	   the	   continuity	   of	   supply	   being	   the	   most	   closely	  scrutinized	  by	  regulatory	  authorities.5	  The	  quality	  of	  electricity	  distribution	  is	  regulated	  by	   the	   CRE.	   For	   the	   continuity	   of	   supply	   (our	   main	   focus	   in	   this	   paper),	   the	   CRE	  measures	   quality	   by	   the	   minutes	   of	   interruption	   from	   which	   a	   series	   of	   exceptional	  events	  are	  removed	  (the	  so-­‐called	  “criterion	  B”).	  During	  our	  sample	  period	  (2003-­‐2005),	  the	   quality	   of	   electricity	   distribution,	   measured	   by	   the	   frequency	   of	   interruption	   per	  customer	  (SAIFI)	  or	  the	  total	  minutes	  of	  interruption	  (SAIDI)	  has	  improved	  slightly	  (see	  Figure	   1).6	  	   It	   can	   be	   observed	   that,	   in	   2006,	   both	   the	   frequency	   and	   the	   number	   of	  interruptions	   are	   higher	   than	   their	   2000	   level.	   As	   quality	   is	   a	   major	   concern,	   the	  regulator	  has	  introduced	  in	  2009	  an	  incentive	  mechanism	  based	  on	  a	  quality	  target	  with	  rewards/penalties	   set	   according	   to	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   the	   objectives.	   In	   the	   current	  mechanism,	  the	  penalty	  for	  each	  minute	  of	  interruption	  across	  all	  customers	  above	  the	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4.	  METHODOLOGY	  We	  model	   the	  production	  process	   of	   a	  DSO	  using	   a	  multi-­‐input,	  multi-­‐output	  distance	  function.	   The	   distance	   function	   is	   input-­‐oriented.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   traditional	   inputs	  (capital	   and	   operating	   expenses),	   we	   add	   the	   number	   of	   interruptions	   (a	   quality	  variable)	   as	   a	   third	   input.	   That	   is,	   interruptions	   are	   introduced	   as	   a	   bad	   input	   (see	  Giannakis	   et	   al.,	   2005	   and	  Growitsch	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   The	   logic	   is	   that	   the	   operators	   can	  substitute	  between	  regular	  inputs	  (labour,	  capital	  etc.)	  and	  the	  inconvenience	  faced	  by	  the	   customers	   (interruptions).	   	   The	   rational	   operator	   will	   look	   at	   the	   “price	   of	  interruptions”	  (e.g.,	  the	  penalty	  imposed	  by	  the	  regulator)	  and	  compare	  it	  with	  the	  price	  of	  other	  inputs	  (e.g.,	  labour)	  before	  deciding	  upon	  the	  optimal	  (cost	  minimising)	  mix	  of	  inputs	  to	  use.	  If	   the	   production	   technology	   (frontier)	   is	   known	   (which	   is	   rarely	   the	   case)	   we	   can	  measure	   the	  distance	   that	  each	  data	  point	   (firm)	   lies	  below	  the	   frontier	  by	  calculating	  the	  amount	  by	  which	  the	  input	  vector	  (x)	  can	  be	  proportionally	  reduced	  while	  holding	  the	   output	   vector	   (y)	   constant.	   That	   is,	   for	   each	   data	   point	   (x,y)	   we	   seek	   to	   find	   the	  biggest	   possible	   value	   of	   the	   scalar	   ρ	   such	   that	   ( )yx ,ρ 	  remains	   within	   the	   feasible	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production	   set	   bounded	   by	   the	   frontier.	  ρ	   is	   the	   technical	   efficiency	   score	   of	   the	   firm	  meaning	   that	  a	   firm	  can	   reduce	   input	  usage	  by	  1/ρ	   and	  still	  produce	   the	   same	  output	  vector.	  	  In	  reality,	  the	  production	  frontier	  is	  rarely	  known.	  Instead	  it	  is	  estimated	  using	  sample	  data	  on	  a	  number	  of	  firms.	  This	  generally	  involves	  fitting	  an	  empirical	  frontier	  that	  aims	  to	  minimize	  these	  distances	  so	  that	  the	  frontier	  is	  a	  “tight-­‐fit”	  to	  the	  data.	  In	  this	  paper	  we	  use	  parametric	  methods	  to	  estimate	  an	  input	  distance	  function.	  The	  input	  distance	  function	  may	  be	  defined	  on	  the	  input	  set,	  L(y),	  as:	  	   ( ) ( ) ( ){ }yxyxI LρρD ∈= :max, ,	   (1)	  where	   the	   input	   set	   ( )yL 	  represents	   the	   set	   of	   all	   input	   vectors,	   Kx +∈R ,	   which	   can	  produce	  the	  output	  vector,	   My +∈R .	  That	  is,	  	   ( ) { }yxxy K  producecan:+∈= RL .	   (2)	  
( )yxI ,D 	  	   is	   non-­‐decreasing,	   positively	   linearly	   homogeneous	   and	   concave	   in	   x,	   and	  increasing	  in	  y.	  The	  distance	  function	  will	  take	  a	  value	  which	  is	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  one	  if	  the	  input	  vector,	  x,	  is	  an	  element	  of	  the	  feasible	  input	  set,	   ( )yL .	  That	  is,	   ( ) 1, ≥yxID 	  if	  	   ( )yx L∈ .	  Furthermore,	  the	  distance	  function	  will	  take	  a	  value	  of	  unity	  if	  x	  is	  located	  on	  the	  inner	  boundary	  of	  the	  input	  set.	  	  



































l zθyxδxxβ 	   (3)	  
where	  the	  	   ( )J1jz j ,..,=  denote environmental factors and 	  i	  the	  i-­‐th	  firm	  in	  the	  sample	  of	  
N	  firms.7	  	  Note	  that	  to	  obtain	  the	  frontier	  surface	  (i.e.,	  the	  transformation	  function)	  one	  would	   set	   Di=1,	   which	   implies	   the	   left	   hand	   side	   of	   equation	   (3)	   is	   equal	   to	   zero.	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Environmental	  factors	  are	  assumed	  to	  have	  a	  direct	   linear	  influence	  on	  the	  production	  structure.	   In	  other	  words,	  potentially	  each	  firm	  faces	  a	  different	  production	  frontier	  at	  each	  period	  given	  the	  effect	  of	   jz factors on the technology (Coelli et al., 1999).	  Imposing	  homogeneity	  of	  degree	  +1	  in	  inputs	  and	  rearranging	  we	  obtain	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and	  those	  required	  for	  symmetry	  are	  	  	   M2,...,1,nm,,nmmn == αα ,	  and	   K2,...,1,k,,kk == lββ ll .	   (6)	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for	  the	  case	  of	  outputs.	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mii re ,	   (11)	  With	   1,1 ii −=−> ee and	   1i −<e 	  indicating	   increasing,	   constant	   or	   decreasing	   returns	  to	  scale,	  respectively	  (Färe	  and	  Primont,	  1995).	  	  Furthermore,	   a	   well-­‐behaved	   production	   function	   must	   satisfy	   some	   desirable	  properties,	   among	   them	  monotonicity	   and	   curvature	   conditions.	  Monotonicity	   implies	  that	   the	   input	   distance	   function	   analysed	   here	   has	   to	   be	   non-­‐decreasing	   in	   inputs	  
( )0ki ≥s 	  and	   non-­‐increasing	   in	   outputs	   ( )0mi ≤r 	  (Färe	   and	   Primont,	   1995).	   Curvature	  conditions	  imply	  that	  the	  input	  distance	  function	  satisfy	  convexity	  in	  outputs	  and	  quasi-­‐convexity	  in	  inputs.	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Stochastic	  frontier	  analysis	  (SFA)	  To	  estimate	   the	  model	  using	  SFA	  methods	  we	  replace	   the	  distance	   term	  with	  an	  error	  term	  that	  has	  two	  i.i.d.	  components.	  That	  is,	  we	  set	   iiiln uvD- −= ,	  where	   ( )2i ,0~ vσNv 	  is	  a	  symmetric	  error	  to	  account	  for	  data	  noise	  and	  the	   ( )2i ,0~ uσNu + is	  a	  one-­‐sided	  error	  to	  account	   for	   technical	   inefficiency	   (TE),	   which	   is	   assumed	   to	   have	   a	   half-­‐normal	  distribution.	   The	   technical	   efficiency	   score	   for	   the	   i-­‐th	   firm	   is	   predicted	   using	   the	  conditional	   expectation:	   ( )[ ]iii uvuE −−exp ,	   which	   takes	   a	   value	   between	   0	   and	   1.	   The	  model	   is	   estimated	   using	   maximum	   likelihood	   (ML)	   methods.	   Note	   that	   prior	   to	  estimation	  the	  variance	  parameters,	   2vσ and	   2uσ 	  are	  re-­‐parameterised	  as	   ( )222 vuu σσσγ += 	  and	   2222 vuv σσσσ +=+ 	  for	  computational	  convenience.1	  
Unfortunately,	   we	   are	   unable	   to	   impose	   the	   monotonicity	   conditions	   on	   the	   SFA	  estimation	   using	   traditional	   econometric	   techniques.	   The	   main	   reason	   is	   that	   these	  conditions	   cannot	   be	   introduced	   as	   simple	   restrictions	   on	   parameters.	   As	   a	  consequence,	   the	   unrestricted	   estimations	   can	   potentially	   show	   monotonicity	   and	  curvature	  violations	  at	  specific	  data	  points.	   In	  other	  words,	   incorrect	  computed	  values	  for	  shadow	  shares	  and	  shadow	  prices	  ratios	  at	  particular	  points.9	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	   in	   this	  study	  because	  the	  quality	   input	  has	  a	  particularly	   low	  average	   input	  share	  (less	  than	  5%).	  	  	  	  
Parametric	  linear	  programming	  (PLP)	  In	   this	   paper,	   we	   proceed	   in	   two	   steps.	   After	   verifying	   that	   SFA	   results	   satisfy	  monotonicity	  restrictions	  for	  average	  values	  but	  not	  for	  extreme	  points,	  we	  recomputed	  the	  input	  distance	  function	  using	  a	  parametric	  linear	  programming	  approach	  (PLP)	  and	  adding	   monotonicity	   constraints.	   The	   PLP	   is	   a	   deterministic	   approach,	   it	   ignores	   the	  effect	  of	  unobserved	  variables,	  but	  monotonicity	  restrictions	  can	  be	  included	  easily.	  	  As	  we	  are	   interested	   in	   computing	   the	   shadow	  price	  of	  quality	   for	   each	  observation,	   it	   is	  essential	  to	  have	  the	  monotonicity	  constraints	  satisfied	  at	  all	  points	  and	  not	  only	  for	  the	  average	  firm.10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  Coelli	  et	  al	  (2005)	  for	  further	  details	  on	  the	  SFA	  methodology.	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iDlnMin ,	  subject	  to	  the	  constraints	  that:	  
0Dln i ≥ ,	  	  	  	  	  i	  =	  1,	  2,	  …,	  N,	  
0ki ≥s ,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  i	  =	  1,	  2,	  …,	  N,	  	  k	  =	  1,	  2,	  …,	  K,	  	  	  	  	  	  
0mi ≤r ,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  i	  =	  1,	  2,	  …,	  N,	  	  m	  =	  1,	  2,	  …,	  M,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  same	  homogeneity	  and	  symmetry	  constraints	  in	  (4)	  and	  (5).	  	  
As an illustration, note that the LP algorithm used to solve our model consists of 304 
unknown variables (37 distance function parameters and 276 TE scores) estimated under 7 
equality (homogeneity) restrictions and 1.656 inequality (monotonicity) restrictions. For this 
purpose we run the Linprog routine in MATLAB.	  	  	  
	  
5.	  DATA	  The	   selection	  and	  measurement	  of	   input,	   output	  and	  environmental	   variables	   is	   a	  key	  aspect	   of	   any	   efficiency	   analysis	   exercise.	   In	   this	   study	   we	   have	   drawn	   upon	   our	  knowledge	  of	   the	  key	  cost	  drivers	   in	  the	  French	  electricity	  distribution	  industry,	  along	  with	   reviewing	   the	   experiences	   gained	   in	   previous	   analyses.	   For	   example,	   see	   those	  studies	  surveyed	  in	  London	  Economics	  (1999)	  and	  Jamasb	  and	  Pollitt	  (2001),	  and	  more	  recent	   studies,	   such	   as	   Lawrence	   and	   Diewert	   (2006),	   Edvardsen	   et	   al	   (2006)	   and	  Jamasb	  et	  al.	  (2010).	  
	  
Output	  variables	  Three	   output	   variables	   are	   used	   in	   the	   present	   study:	   energy	   supplied,	   number	   of	  customers	   and	   the	   service	   area.	   The	   amount	   of	   energy	   supplied	   in	   giga-­‐watt	   hours	  (GWH)	   is	  generally	   the	   first	  output	  variable	   thought	  of,	   since	   the	  aim	  of	  a	  distribution	  company	   is	   to	   “supply	   electricity	   to	   customers”.	   Although	   a	   distribution	   network	  operator	   cannot	   normally	   determine	   the	   amount	   of	   electricity	   distributed,	   it	   has	   to	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ensure	   that	   all	   its	   network	   assets	   have	   the	   capacity	   to	   deliver	   this	   energy	   to	   its	  customers.	  Hence,	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  energy	  supplied	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  load	   capacity	   of	   the	   network.	   The	   measure	   used	   in	   this	   study	   is	   gross	   electricity	  distributed	  (which	  includes	  losses).11	  The	   number	   of	   customers	   (CUST)	   is	   also	   used	   as	   an	   output	   variable	   in	   our	   model	  because	   we	   believe	   that	   this	   variable	   is	   needed	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   model	   does	   not	  unfairly	  discriminate	  against	  those	  operators	  which	  sell	  smaller	  amounts	  of	  energy	  per	  customer.	   Furthermore,	   a	   large	   part	   of	   distribution	   activities	   (relating	   to	   metering	  services,	   customer	   connections,	   customer	   calls,	   etc.)	   are	   directly	   correlated	   to	   the	  number	  of	  customers.	  Note	  that	  our	  measure	  only	  includes	  Low	  Voltage	  (LV)	  customers,	  since	  industrial	  customers	  who	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  Medium	  Voltage	  (MV)	  network	  are	  rather	  small	  in	  number.	  The	  surface	  covered	  in	  square	  kilometres	  (KM2)	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  network	  dispersion.	  A	  lot	   of	   network	   operations,	   such	   as	   routine	   maintenance,	   overhaul,	   vegetation	  management	  for	  overhead	  lines,	  etc.	  are	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  length	  of	  MV	  and	  LV	  lines	  or,	   indirectly,	   to	   the	   size	  of	   the	   area	   served.	  Moreover,	   the	   reliability	   of	   a	  distribution	  network	   and	   therefore	   the	   level	   of	   quality	   of	   supply	   is	   often	   affected	  by	   the	   length	   of	  feeders,	   in	   other	   words,	   by	   customers’	   density.	   In	   big	   cities,	   where	   the	   feeders	   are	  mostly	   short	   and	   underground,	   the	   number	   of	   outages	   should	   be	   lower	   than	   in	   less	  dense	  areas	  which	  tend	  to	  have	  a	  high	  proportion	  of	  overhead	  lines.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  costs	  of	  repairs	  are	  expected	  to	  differ	  between	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas.	  	  The	  net	  effect	  of	  using	  these	  three	  output	  variables	  in	  our	  model	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  key	  aspects	  of	  output	  heterogeneity	  are	  captured,	   so	   that	  when	  we	  conduct	  benchmarking	  comparisons	  using	   technical	  efficiency	  measures,	  we	  are	  conditioning	  on	   these	   factors	  and	  hence	  comparing	   like	  with	   like.	  That	   is,	  not	  comparing	  distribution	  units	   like	  Lille	  with	  the	  Southern	  Alps,	  and	  so	  on.	   	  Nevertheless,	  we	  are	  aware	  that	  with	  three	  output	  variables,	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  control	  for	  all	  environmental	  differences	  that	  could	  influence	  costs,	   such	   as	   influence	   of	   forests	   and	   mountainous	   terrain,	   ages	   of	   the	   assets,	  accessibility	   of	   lines	   or	   substations,	   climatic	   factors,	   etc.	   To	  mitigate	   this	   problem,	  we	  introduce	   control	   variables	   to	   explain	   potential	   differences	   on	   the	   production	  technology	  driven	  by	  these	  factors.	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Input	  variables	  The	  inputs	  used	  in	  electricity	  distribution	  are	  many	  and	  varied.	  In	  terms	  of	  capital	  inputs	  there	   are	   underground	   and	   overhead	   lines	   of	   various	   voltage	   levels,	   transformers,	  vehicles,	   computers,	   and	   so	   on.	   Plus	   we	   have	   various	   types	   of	   labour	   –	   technicians,	  engineers,	   managers,	   etc.	   –	   plus	   a	   variety	   of	   other	   materials	   and	   services.	   One	   could	  perhaps	   define	   dozens	   of	   input	   variables,	   but	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   limitations	   in	   the	  production	  model	   prevent	   us	   from	  doing	   that.	   Instead	  we	   have	   chosen	   to	   define	   only	  three	  input	  variables:	  two	  monetary	  inputs,	  the	  capital	  inputs	  (CAP)	  and	  the	  non-­‐capital	  inputs	  (OPEX)	  and	  one	  physical	  (bad)	   input,	   the	  number	  of	   interruptions	  (NINT).	   	  The	  bad	   input	   is	   considered	   as	   an	   imperfect	   substitute	   to	   the	   other	   two	   inputs.	  Monetary	  inputs	  are	  expressed	  in	  2005	  prices	  using	  a	  gross	  industrial	  commodities	  price	  deflator.	  Capital	   is	   measured	   using	   gross	   (not	   depreciated)	   value.	   We	   have	   chosen	   gross	   in	  preference	   to	   net	   because	  we	  wish	   to	   avoid	   the	   situation	  where	   an	   operator	   that	   has	  conducted	  a	   lot	  of	   recent	   investment	   is	   labelled	  as	   inefficient	  because	   their	  net	  capital	  stock	   is	   high	   relative	   to	   others.	   In	   using	   this	   measure	   we	   implicitly	   make	   two	  assumptions.	   First	   we	   assume	   that	   asset	   age	   does	   not	   significantly	   affect	   service	  potential.	  Second	  we	  assume	  that	  all	  operators	  have	  assets	  with	  similar	   life	  spans	  and	  hence	  that	  annual	  service	  potential	  is	  proportional	  to	  the	  stock.	  These	  assumptions	  are	  arguably	   quite	   reasonable	   in	   the	   current	   study,	   since	   all	   the	   data	   come	   from	   a	   single	  distribution	   operator	   (ERDF)	   who	   defines	   and	   manages	   very	   similar	   policies	   for	  investment,	   operations	   and	   network	   asset	   development	   across	   the	   various	   local	  distribution	  units.12	  In	  terms	  of	  non-­‐capital	   inputs,	  we	  use	  network	  operating	  expenses	  net	  of	  depreciation	  and	  interest	  as	  our	  aggregate	  measure	  of	  these	   items.	  These	  are	  the	  direct	  operational	  costs	   of	   local	   distribution	   units,	   excluding	   centralized	   network	   service	   support	   and	  overhead	  costs.	  	  These	  operational	  costs	  relate	  to	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operations,	  such	  as:	  
• operating,	  developing	  and	  maintaining	  distribution	  network	  assets:	  looking	  after	  substations	  and	  overhead	  lines,	  fault	  repairs,	  remote	  control	  and	  dispatching,	  and	  so	  on;	  
• running	  connections	  services;	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• providing	  meter	  services	  and	  any	  other	  customer	  interventions;	  
• relations	  with	  local	  authorities	  and	  customers;	  etc.	  	  We	  could	  have	  chosen	   to	  split	   this	  OPEX	  grouping	   into	   labour	  and	  non-­‐labour	  groups,	  but	  given	  that	  labour	  expense	  dominates	  this	  category	  and	  that	  outsourcing	  is	  blurring	  the	  boundaries	  between	  these	  two	  categories,	  we	  decided	  to	  use	  a	  single	  variable.	  Finally,	   quality	   is	   measured	   as	   the	   total	   number	   of	   interruptions	   (NINT)	   –	   excluding	  short	  interruptions	  of	  three	  minutes	  or	  less.	  	  The	  total	  number	  of	  interruptions	  NINT	  has	  been	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  
	   NINT	  =	  SAIFI	  ×	  Total	  number	  of	  customers	  served.	  According	   to	   the	   international	   standards	   relative	   to	   quality	   of	   supply,	   SAIFI	   (System	  Average	  Interruption	  Frequency)	  is	  the	  average	  number	  of	  sustained	  interruptions	  (>3	  min)	  experienced	  per	  customer	  served	  per	  year:	  	  
	   SAIFI	  =
servedcustomersofnumberTotal
erruptionsintcustomerofnumberTotal .	  
Therefore,	   NINT	   represents	   the	   total	   number	   of	   outages.	   It	   includes	   unplanned	  interruptions,	   even	   those	   for	  which	   the	   distribution	   company	   is	   not	   responsible	   (e.g.,	  due	   to	   transmission	   network	   outages),	   and	   also	   planned	   interruptions	   (e.g.,	   to	  accommodate	   extensions,	   upgrades,	   etc.).	   	   We	   do	   not	   exclude,	   as	   it	   usually	   done	   for	  regulatory	  purpose,	  outages	  due	  to	  exceptional	  events,	  as	  we	  believe	  that	  the	  distinction	  is	  rather	  artificial.	  	  	  Nevertheless,	  we	  include	  the	  percentage	  of	  exceptional	  events	  as	  an	  environmental	  factor	  (on	  average	  11%	  of	  the	  interruptions	  are	  labelled	  as	  exceptional)	  to	  take	  into	  account	  unobserved	  heterogeneity	  across	  centres	  such	  as	  different	  weather	  conditions.	  	  	  	  	  
Environmental	  factors	  The	  estimated	  production	  technology	  is	  (implicitly)	  assumed	  to	  be	  potentially	  different	  for	   each	  DSOs	  and	  each	  period.	  To	   take	   into	   account	   local	   variations	   across	  DSOs	  and	  time,	   we	   introduce	   a	   number	   of	   environmental	   factors	   in	   the	   production	   function	   as	  regressors.	  13   We thus have an extended distance function that take into account of 
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differences between DSOs that are not linked to inputs and outputs but to specific local 
conditions.    	  	  The	   variables	   that	  we	   consider	   are	   as	   follows	   (for	   each	   variable,	   the	   expected	   sign	   is	  reported	  into	  brackets):	  
• UNDERG	   (+)	   is	   the	   proportion	   of	   the	   network	   that	   is	   located	   underground	   (as	  opposed	   to	   being	   overhead	   on	   poles).	   We	   expect	   that	   the	   higher	   asset	   values	   for	  underground	  lines	  in	  CAP	  will	  be	  offset	  by	  the	  reduced	  maintenance	  requirements	  in	  OPEX	  and	  the	  reduced	  number	  of	  outages.	  However,	  there	  may	  be	  some	  other	  aspect	  to	  undergrounding	   that	  we	  have	  not	   captured	   in	  our	  model,	   and	  hence	  we	   include	  this	  variable	  to	  see	  if	  we	  can	  identify	  an	  additional	  effect.	  
• DENSE	   (-­‐)	   is	   the	   proportion	   of	   customers	   that	   are	   located	   in	   towns	   involving	   less	  than	   10,000	   inhabitants.	   Centres	   deserving	   a	   higher	   proportion	   of	   rural	   areas	   are	  potentially	  facing	  less	  favourable	  production	  conditions.	  
• AGE	  (± )	   is	   the	  ratio	  of	  net	  book	  value	  to	  gross	  book	  value	  of	  assets.	  Hence	   it	   is	  an	  index	  of	  average	  asset	  age	  that	  varies	  between	  0	  and	  1,	  with	  higher	  values	  indicating	  newer	  assets.	  The	  expected	  effect	  on	  the	  production	  technology	  is	  ambiguous.	  On	  the	  one	   hand,	   DSOs	  with	   older	   assets	   are	   using	   a	   less	   reliable	   technology	   but,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  DSOs	  with	  newer	  assets	  face	  adjustment	  costs.	  	  	  	  
• HVCON	   (+)	   is	   the	   amount	   of	   high	   voltage	   capacity	   that	   is	   contracted	   to	   industrial	  customers	  divided	  by	  total	  transformer	  potential.	   It	   is	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  degree	  to	  which	   industrial	   customers	   are	   important	   to	   the	   DSO.	   A	   higher	   proportion	   of	  potential	   industrial	   demand	   would	   probably	   affect,	   ceteris	   paribus,	   positively	   the	  production	  technology.	  We	  consider	  that	  the	  production	  function	  is	  time-­‐invariant.	  But	  electricity	  consumption	  and	  input	  uses,	  mainly	  outages	  and	  repairs,	  could	  be	  affected	  by	  changes	  in	  the	  demand	  and	   in	  weather	   conditions,	   included	   exceptional	   events.	   To	   take	   this	   into	   account,	  we	  incorporate	  the	  following	  context	  variables:	  	  
• D2004	  (± )	  and	  D2005	  (± )	  are	  dummy	  variables	  that	  attempt	  to	  capture	  factors	  that	  vary	   from	   one	   year	   to	   another,	   such	   as	   the	   effects	   of	   temperature	   variations	   on	  demand	  patterns	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  storm	  events	  on	  outages.	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• EXNINT	  (-­‐)	  is	  the	  proportion	  of	  NINT	  that	  is	  due	  to	  exceptional	  events.	  
• EXMINT	   (-­‐)	   is	   the	   proportion	   of	   MINT	   (minutes	   of	   interruptions)	   that	   is	   due	   to	  exceptional	  events.	  
• GROWTH	   (-­‐)	   is	   the	   ratio	   of	   customer	   numbers	   in	   the	   current	   year	   to	   customer	  numbers	   in	   the	   previous	   year.	   	   Important	   positive	   (negative)	   variations	   in	   the	  number	  of	  customers	  could	  potentially	  affect,	  negatively	  (positively),	  the	  production	  environment	  of	  a	  centre	  given	  high	  adaptation	  costs.	  	  	  	  	  
Descriptive	  statistics	  We	   have	   access	   to	   a	   unique	   and	   comprehensive	   database	   covering	   92	   French	   DSOs	  (nearly	  all	  the	  DSOs	  in	  France)	  during	  a	  three-­‐year	  period.	  All	  the	  DSOs	  have	  the	  same	  perimeter	  of	  activities	  and	  data	  are	  provided	  by	  a	  single	  source.	  The	  units	  of	  observation	  are	  the	  92	  ERDF	  centres	  (Paris	  is	  not	  included	  in	  this	  study).	  All	  the	  values	  reported	  in	  the	   tables	   are	   averages	   for	   the	   three-­‐year	   period	   2003-­‐2005.	   Table	   1	   provides	   an	  overview	   of	   outputs,	   inputs	   and	   environmental	   factors.	   It	   illustrates	   the	   range	   of	  variation	   among	   centres,	   not	   only	   on	   size,	   measured	   by	   the	   number	   of	   residential	  customers	  and	  the	  surface	  served,	  but	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  share	  of	  underground	  lines	  and	  of	  small	  towns,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  percentage	  of	  outages,	  frequency	  and	  duration,	  due	  to	  exceptional	  events.	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Table	  1:	  Output	  and	  input	  variables.	  Descriptive	  statistics	  (n=276)	  	  Variable	   Units	   mean	   std	   min	   max	  
Outputs	   	   	   	   	   	  Customers	  (CUST)	   N	   324,857	   134,162	   109,435	   762,905	  Surface	  (KM2)	   km2	   5,532	   3,125	   129	   13,871	  Electricity	  (GWH)	   GWh	   3,557	   1,477	   1,001	   7,976	  
Inputs	   	   	   	   	   	  Operational	  expenditures	  (OPEX)	   103	  €	   22,804	   8,401	   10,575	   57,591	  Capital	  (CAP)	   103	  €	   636,134	   220,018	   247,464	   1,250,115	  Number	  of	  interruptions	  (NINT)	   n	   384,476	   204,569	   48,886	   1,632,336	  
Environmental	  factors	   	   	   	   	   	  Underground	  lines	  (UNDERG)	   ratio	   0.39	   0.19	   0.13	   0.88	  Small	  towns	  (DENS)	   ratio	   0.44	   0.23	   0.00	   0.86	  Assets	  age	  proxy	  (AGE)	   ratio	   0.62	   0.03	   0.53	   0.68	  Customers	  growth	  (GROWTH)	   %	   1.97	   1.81	   -­‐5.46	   19.97	  HV	  industrial	  capacity	  (HVCO)	   ratio	   0.24	   0.06	   0.14	   0.42	  Exceptional	  events:	  	  -­‐	  Frequency	  (EXNINT)	   ratio	   0.11	   0.11	   0.00	   0.49	  	  	  -­‐	  Minutes	  (EXMINT)	   ratio	   0.13	   0.18	   0.00	   0.82	  Note:	  €	  2005	  prices.	  




	  In	   this	   section	   we	   report	   the	   parameter	   estimates	   and	   the	   technical	   efficiency	   (TE)	  scores	   obtained	   using	   Stochastic	   Frontier	   Analysis	   (SFA)	   and	   Parametric	   Linear	  Programming	   (PLP)	  with	  monotonicity	   restrictions	   imposed.	  Finally,	  we	  report	  partial	  elasticities	  and	  quality	  shadow	  prices	  computed	  for	  the	  PLP	  model.	  Table	   3	   presents	   parameters	   of	   the	   distance	   function	   for	   both	   the	   SFA	   and	   the	   PLP	  models.	   Note	   that	   output	   (ym,	   m=1,	   …,	   M)	   and	   input	   (xk,	   k=1,	   ...,	   K)	   variables	   are	   in	  logarithms	  and	  also	  in	  deviations	  with	  respect	  to	  means	  and	  environmental	   factors	  (zj,	  
j=1,	  …,	  J)	  in	  deviations	  with	  respect	  to	  means,	  except	  for	  dummy	  variables	  (z1	  and	  z2).	  In	  the	  SFA	  model,	  x1	  was	  chosen	  as	  the	  reference	  variable	  to	  impose	  homogeneity	  of	  degree	  +	  1.16	  Therefore,	  x1	  becomes	  the	  dependent	  variable	  and	  xk	  are	  replaced	  by	  x*k=xk	  -­‐x1	  for	  k	  
=	  2,	  …	  k	  .	  	  	  Note	  that	  y1=CUST;	  y2=	  KM2;	  y3=GWH;	  x1=OPEX;	  x2=CAP;	  x3=NINT.	  	  Given	   that	   these	   variables	   are	   expressed	   in	   logarithmic	   deviations	   from	  mean	   values,	  first	   order	   coefficients	   associated	   with	   outputs	   and	   inputs	   may	   be	   interpreted	   as	  distance	   function	   elasticities	   with	   respect	   to	   outputs	   and	   inputs	   at	   the	   sample	  mean,	  respectively.	   In	   both	   models	   these	   coefficients	   have	   the	   expected	   sign,	   negative	   for	  outputs	  elasticities	  ( mir )	  and	  positive	   for	   inputs	  ( kis ),	  and	  are	  close	  each	  other.	   	  Under	  the	   SFA	  model,	   in	  most	   cases	   these	   coefficients	   are	   statistically	   significant	   at	   the	   1%	  confidence	   level,	   except	   for	   the	   coefficient	   of	   the	   quality	   variable	   (x3=NINT).	   Second	  order	  terms	  are	  significant	  for	  the	  squared	  capital	  variable	  (x2=CAP),	  the	  squared	  quality	  variable	  (x3=NINT)	  and	  for	  the	  squared	  customer	  output	  (y1=CUST),	  but	  insignificant	  for	  most	  of	  the	  other	  terms.	  The	  coefficients	  reported	  in	  Table	  3	  show	  close	  results	  between	  SFA	  and	  PLP	  models	  at	  mean	  sample	  values.	  That	  is,	  independent	  of	  their	  stochastic	  and	  deterministic	   nature,	   the	   extended	   distance	   function	   estimates	   are	   quite	   similar.	  	  	  However,	  the	  SFA	  estimates	  do	  not	  always	  satisfy	  monotonicity	  properties	  at	  all	  points,	  as	  PLP	  does.17	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Table	  3:	  SFA	  and	  PLP	  coefficients	  Explanatory	  variables	   SFA	   PLP	  Coef.	   (t-­‐ratio)	   Coef.	  
α0	   Intercept	   0.491	   (	  	  2.5)	  ***	   0.754	  
α1	   ln(y1)	  (CUST)	   -­‐0.759	   (-­‐16.0)	  ***	   -­‐0.683	  
α2	   ln(y2)	  (KM2)	   -­‐0.055	   (-­‐2.8)	  ***	   -­‐0.051	  
α3	   ln(y3)	  (GWH)	   -­‐0.147	   (-­‐3.3)	  ***	   -­‐0.254	  
α11	   ln(y1).ln(y1)	   0.983	   (	  	  2.0)	  **	   0.358	  
α22	   ln(y2).ln(y2)	   0.022	   (	  	  1.7)	  *	   0.004	  
α33	   ln(y3).ln(y3)	   0.197	   (	  	  0.4)	   0.132	  
α12	   ln(y1).ln(y2)	   0.022	   (	  	  0.4)	   -­‐0.085	  
α13	   ln(y1).ln(y3)	   -­‐0.652	   (-­‐1.4)	   -­‐0.258	  
α23	   ln(y2).ln(y3)	   0.115	   (	  	  2.1)	  **	   0.121	  
β1	   ln(x1)	  (OPEX)	   0.501	   	   0.587	  
β2	   ln(x2)	  (CAP)	   0.467	   (	  	  9.7)	  ***	   0.308	  
β3	   ln(x3)	  (NINT)	   0.032	   (	  	  1.5)	   0.105	  
β11	   ln(x1).ln(x1)	   -­‐0.821	   	   -­‐0.479	  
β22	   ln(x2).ln(x2)	   -­‐0.890	   (-­‐3.4)	  ***	   -­‐0.406	  
β33	   ln(x3).ln(x3)	   -­‐0.164	   (-­‐2.3)	  **	   -­‐0.078	  
β12	   ln(x1).ln(x2)	   0.773	   	   0.404	  
β13	   ln(x1).ln(x3)	   0.048	   	   0.076	  
β23	   ln(x2).ln(x3)	   0.117	   (	  	  1.1)	   0.003	  
δ11	   ln(x1).ln(y1)	   -­‐0.233	   	   0.119	  
δ12	   ln(x1).ln(y2)	   0.049	   	   0.056	  
δ13	   ln(x1).ln(y3)	   0.210	   	   -­‐0.206	  
δ21	   ln(x2).ln(y1)	   0.201	   (	  	  0.7)	   -­‐0.031	  
δ22	   ln(x2).ln(y2)	   -­‐0.062	   (-­‐1.6)	   -­‐0.071	  
δ23	   ln(x2).ln(y3)	   -­‐0.174	   (-­‐0.7)	   0.141	  
δ31	   ln(x3).ln(y1)	   0.032	   (	  	  0.2)	   -­‐0.088	  
δ32	   ln(x3).ln(y2)	   0.013	   (	  	  0.7)	   0.015	  
δ33	   ln(x3).ln(y3)	   -­‐0.036	   (-­‐0.3)	   0.064	  Environmental	  factors	  
θ1	   z1	  (UNDERG)	   0.236	   (	  	  7.0)	  ***	   0.186	  
θ2	   z2	  (DENSE)	   -­‐0.040	   (-­‐1.2)	   -­‐0.023	  
θ3	   z3	  (AGE)	   -­‐0.608	   (-­‐3.2)	  ***	   -­‐0.888	  
θ4	   z4	  (HVCON)	   0.033	   (	  	  1.1)	   0.107	  
θ5	   z5	  (D2004)	   -­‐0.015	   (-­‐1.1)	   0.009	  
θ6	   z6	  (D2005)	   0.081	   (	  	  4.8)	  ***	   0.127	  
θ7	   z7	  (EXNINT)	   -­‐0.005	   (-­‐0.6)	   -­‐0.013	  
θ8	   z8	  (EXMINT)	   0.004	   (	  	  0.6)	   -­‐0.002	  
θ9	   z9	  (GROWTH)	   -­‐0.006	   (-­‐0.9)	   0.006	  
σ	   22 vu σσ + 	   0.015	   (	  	  4.4)	  ***	   	  
γ ( )222 vuu σσσ +  0.745	   (	  	  5.0)	  ***	   	  	   LLF 286.0	   	   	  ***,	   **	   	   and	   *	   significant	   at	   1%,	   5%	   and	   10%	   level,	   respectively.	  Underlined	   parameters	   are	   calculated	   by	   applying	   the	  homogeneity	  conditions.	  Variables	  ln(ym)	  and	  ln(xk)	  are	  expressed	  in	  deviations	  from	  sample	  mean	  values.	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Environmental	  factors	  Of	   the	  environment	   factors	   (zj	   variables),	  we	  observe	   that	  under	   the	  SFA	  and	   the	  PLP	  model	  results	  are	  quite	  similar.	  Moreover,	  under	  the	  SFA	  model	  DENSE	  (z2),	  HVCON	  (z3),	  D2004	  (z5),	  EXNINT	  (z7),	  EXMINT	  (z8)	  and	  GROWTH	  (z9),	  are	  statistically	  insignificant	  (at	  the	   5%	   level).	   UNDERG	   (z1),	   AGE	   (z3)	   and	   D2005	   (z6)	   are	   the	   only	   variables	   that	   are	  significant.	  The	  coefficient	  of	  UNDERG	  (percentage	  of	  underground	   lines)	   is	  positive.	  As	  expected,	  this	  factor	  has	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  production	  performances,	  because	  underground	  lines	  are	  less	  susceptible	  to	  storm	  damage,	  etc.	  	  The	  coefficient	  of	  AGE	  (the	  ratio	  of	  net	  (depreciated)	  to	  gross	  capital	  in	  book	  values)	  is	  negative.	   	   As	   indicated	   before,	   the	   expected	   effect	   of	   this	   factor	   on	   production	  technology	   was	   ambiguous.	   Likely,	   adjustment	   costs,	   “teething	   problems”,	   associated	  with	  newer	  assets	  exceed	  advantages	  in	  terms	  of	  lower	  maintenance	  costs.	  Finally,	  year	  2005	  has	  a	  positive	  sign	  and	  D2005	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  1%	  level.	  The	  Centres	  could	  be	  improving	   their	   productivity	   by	   making	   a	   better	   input	   use	   (technical	   change).	   But,	  unfortunately,	  with	  a	  limited	  time	  frame,	  we	  cannot	  screen	  between	  permanent	  (better	  management)	   and	   temporary	   effects	   (weather	   conditions)	   even	   though,	   as	   indicated	  before,	  the	  effect	  of	  outages	  due	  to	  exceptional	  events	  (EXNINT	  and	  EXMINT)	  appear	  to	  be	  non-­‐significant.	  	  	  	  	  
Technical	  Efficiency	  (TE)	  	  In	   the	   SFA	   model	   γ= 0.745	   implies	   that	   the	   error	   term	   is	   primarily	   associated	   with	  technical	   efficiency.	  18	  	   Table	  4	   reports	   average	   technical	   efficiency	   (TE)	   scores	   for	   the	  SFA	  and	  PLP	  models	  by	  quintiles	  of	  customers’	  density,	  quality	  (SAIFI)	  and	  underground	  lines	  (%).	  As	  expected,	  SFA	  technical	  efficiency	  scores	  are	  higher	  than	  PLP	  scores,	  0.922	  vs.	   0.864	  on	  average.	  This	   is	  due	   to	   the	   role	  played	  by	  noise	  under	   the	  SFA	  model,	   as	  indicated	  before.	  The	  Pearson	  correlation	  between	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  scores	  is	  0.80.	  	  Similar	  slight	  variations	  are	  observed	  for	  both	  measures;	  decreasing	  technical	  efficiency	  with	  customers	  density	  and	  the	  proportion	  of	  underground	  lines,	  while	  increasing	  with	  quality	  levels.	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In	  order	  to	  identify	  these	  relationships	  among	  inputs,	  we	  turn	  now	  to	  a	  deeper	  study	  of	  the	   underlying	   production	   technology,	   looking	   at	   distance	   function	   elasticities	   and	  shadow	  prices	  at	  all	  points	  (92	  Centres,	  3	  years).	  For	  this	  purpose,	  we	  rely	  exclusively	  on	  PLP	  results.	  Unfortunately,	  but	  as	  expected,	  the	  estimated	  SFA	  technology	  did	  not	  satisfy	  all	  monotonicity	  restrictions	  at	  all	  data	  points.19	  
Table 4: SFA and PLP Technical Efficiency scores by quintiles 	  
Quintiles	   SFA	   PLP	  Customers’	  density	  quintiles	   Quality	  quintiles	  (SAIFI)	   Underground	  lines	  	  	  quintiles	   Customers’	  density	  quintiles	   Quality	  quintiles	  (SAIFI)	   Underground	  lines	  	  	  quintiles	  Q1	   0.924	   0.909	   0.923	   0.890	   0.846	   0.888	  Q2	   0.923	   0.925	   0.927	   0.863	   0.859	   0.869	  Q3	   0.927	   0.927	   0.925	   0.867	   0.882	   0.856	  Q4	   0.925	   0.923	   0.916	   0.859	   0.867	   0.854	  Q5	   0.909	   0.924	   0.918	   0.840	   0.866	   0.853	  All	   0.922	   0.922	   0.922	   0.864	   0.864	   0.864	  Customers’	  density	  quintiles:	  0-­‐30	  (Q1),	  30-­‐46	  (Q2);	  46-­‐71	  (Q3);	  71-­‐114	  (Q4)	  and	  114	  and	  +	  (Q5).	  Quality	  quintiles	  (SAIFI):	  1.9+	  (Q1);	  1.9-­‐1.5	  (Q2);	  1.5-­‐1.26	  (Q3);	  1.26-­‐1.0	  (Q4);	  1.0-­‐0.0	  (Q5).	  	  Underground	  lines	  quintiles:	  0-­‐0.23	  (Q1),	  0.23-­‐0.30	  (Q2);	  0.30-­‐0.37	  (Q3);	  0.37-­‐0.52	  (Q4)	  and	  0.52+	  (Q5).	  
	  
Input	  and	  output	  distance	  function	  elasticities	  (PLP)	  
	  Table	  5	  contains	  information	  on	  distance	  function	  elasticities	  with	  respect	  to	  inputs	  (ski)	  and	  outputs	   (rmi).	  They	  are	  computed	  using	  equations	  (9)	  and	  (10)	  and	  correspond	   to	  input	   shares	   and	   to	   output	   shares,	   respectively.	   Output	   elasticities	   contain	   useful	  information	  on	  the	  cost	  drivers	  of	   the	  DSOs	  and	  the	  scale	  economies.	   	  For	  the	  stake	  of	  clarity,	   we	   consider	   output	   elasticities	   in	   absolute	   value.	   	   At	   the	   aggregate	   level,	   the	  estimated	  output	  elasticities	  (with	  the	  PLP	  method)	  are	  0.683	  for	  CUST,	  0.052	  for	  KM2	  and	  0.256	  for	  GWH	  meaning	  that,	  a	  10%	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  clients,	  in	  the	  surface	  covered	   or	   in	   the	   electricity	   distributed	   requires	   respectively	   a	   6.8%,	   0.5%	   and	   2.5%	  proportional	  increase	  of	  all	  inputs.	  Thus,	  for	  an	  average	  DSO,	  the	  main	  cost	  driver	  is	  the	  number	  of	  clients.	  And,	  should	  all	  outputs	  increase	  proportionally,	  the	  input	  expansion	  required	   would	   be	   less	   than	   proportional	   as	   ei=Σirmi=-­‐0.988>-­‐1,	   implying	   increasing	  returns	  to	  scale	  for	  the	  average	  firm.20	  	  	  In	  Table	  5,	  we	  report	   the	   input	  and	  output	  elasticities	  by	  customers’	  density	  quintiles.	  Input	  combinations	  and	  use	  differ	  with	  customer	  density	  (see	  Table	  2)	  and	  low-­‐density	  centres	   have	   a	   higher	   percentage	   of	   underground	   lines.	   Interestingly,	   the	   distance	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function	   elasticities	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   number	   of	   customers	   decrease	   with	   density	  while,	   simultaneously,	   surface	   elasticities	   and	   most	   notably	   energy	   distributed	  elasticities	   increase.	   	   For	   centres	   in	   high-­‐density	   areas,	   the	  main	   cost	   drivers	   are	   the	  electricity	   distributed	  with	   a	   partial	   elasticity	   equals	   to	   0.547	   for	   the	  DSO	   in	   the	   fifth	  quintile	  of	  customer	  density	  and	  the	  number	  of	  clients	  with	  a	  partial	  elasticity	  of	  GWH	  equal	   to	   0.472.	   	   Conversely,	   for	   the	   centres	   operating	   in	   low-­‐density	   areas,	   increasing	  the	   electricity	  distributed	   requires	   a	   lower	   input	   expansion	  with	   a	  partial	   elasticity	  of	  GWH	  equal	  to	  0.102	  in	  the	  first	  quintile	  of	  customer	  density.	  	  	  Existing	  networks	  are	  thus	  able	  to	  carry	  on	  additional	  electricity	  flows	  at	  low	  cost	  in	  the	  low-­‐density	  regions,	  while	  in	   high-­‐density	   regions,	   additional	   flows	   require	   a	   substantial	   input	   expansion.	   	   And	  conversely,	  it	  is	  relatively	  less	  costly	  to	  connect	  an	  additional	  customer	  in	  a	  high-­‐density	  region	   because	   the	   network	   is	   dense	   and	   connections	   are	   numerous	   than	   in	   a	   low-­‐density	  region.	  	  	  To	  summarize,	  the	  main	  cost	  driver	  in	  low-­‐density	  areas	  is	  the	  number	  of	   customers.	   In	   high-­‐density	   areas,	   both	   the	   number	   of	   clients	   and	   the	   electricity	  distributed	  are	   the	  most	   significant	   cost	  drivers	  of	   the	  DSO.	  Taking	   the	   sum	  of	  partial	  elasticities,	  in	  the	  estimated	  production	  function,	  the	  scale	  elasticities	  go	  from	  increasing	  returns	  in	  low-­‐density	  units	  to	  decreasing	  returns	  in	  high-­‐density	  units21.	  	  
	   Table	  5:	  Distance	  function	  elasticities	  (PLP)	  	  Customers’	  density	  quintiles	  
With	  respect	  to	  inputs	  “input	  shares”	   With	  respect	  to	  outputs	  “output	  shares”	   Scale	  elasticity	  Operational	  costs	  (OPEX)	   Capital	  (CAP)	   Quality	  (NINT)	   Customers	  (CUST)	   Surface	  (KM2)	   Electricity	  distributed	  (GWH)	  Q1	   0.719	   0.161	   0.123	   -­‐0.785	   -­‐0.079	   -­‐0.102	   -­‐0.963	  Q2	   0.648	   0.230	   0.122	   -­‐0.767	   -­‐0.051	   -­‐0.145	   -­‐0.963	  Q3	   0.622	   0.275	   0.103	   -­‐0.729	   -­‐0.043	   -­‐0.198	   -­‐0.970	  Q4	   0.556	   0.336	   0.107	   -­‐0.668	   -­‐0.042	   -­‐0.276	   -­‐0.985	  Q5	   0.402	   0.534	   0.073	   -­‐0.472	   -­‐0.043	   -­‐0.547	   -­‐1.062	  Mean	   0.589	   0.309	   0.106	   -­‐0.683	   -­‐0.052	   -­‐0.256	   -­‐0.988	  Customers’	  density	  quintiles:	  0-­‐30	  (Q1),	  30-­‐46	  (Q2);	  46-­‐71	  (Q3);	  71-­‐114	  (Q4)	  and	  114	  and	  +	  (Q5).	  	  
	  Regarding	  distance	  function	  elasticities	  with	  respect	  to	  inputs,	  we	  observe	  that	  the	  share	  of	  OPEX	  decreases	  with	   customer’s	   density	  while	   the	   share	   of	   CAP	   increases.	   	   Output	  expansion	   requires	   relatively	   more	   capital	   in	   high-­‐density	   areas	   and	   relatively	   more	  operational	   expenditures	   in	   low-­‐density	   areas.	   The	   input	   share	   of	   quality	   is	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comparatively	  low,	  on	  average	  equal	  to	  10.6%,	  and	  decreasing	  slightly	  with	  costumers’	  density.	  
	  
The	  shadow	  price	  of	  quality	  (PLP)	  Using	   the	   estimated	   production	   function	   (with	   the	   PLP	   method	   to	   satisfy	   all	   the	  monotonicity	  restrictions),	  we	  can	   identify,	   for	  each	  observation,	   the	   input	  and	  output	  shadow	   price	   ratios.	   We	   are	   particularly	   interested	   in	   the	   input	   shadow	   price	   ratios	  NINT/OPEX	  and	  NINT/CAP.	  These	  shadow	  price	  ratios	  can	  be	  converted	  into	  a	  shadow	  price	  of	  quality	  by	  assuming	  a	  particular	  observed	  price	  for	  OPEX	  or	  CAP.	  	  For	  OPEX,	  the	  observed	  price	  is	  trivially	  equal	  to	  1€.	  The	  price	  of	  capital	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  estimate,	  since	  it	  requires	  assumptions	  regarding	  depreciation	  and	  interest	  costs.	   	  Hence	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  shadow	  price	  estimate	  obtained	  from	  the	  NINT/OPEX	  shadow	  price	  ratio.	  	  In	   our	   sample,	   the	   average	   shadow	   price	   of	   quality	   (in	   OPEX)	   is	   equal	   to	   10.7€.	   This	  means	  that,	  in	  average,	  the	  DSO	  must	  spend	  an	  extra	  10.7€	  in	  operational	  expenditure	  to	  prevent	  one	  interruption	  or,	  as	  the	  mean	  interruption	  time	  is	  59	  minutes,	  it	  costs	  0.181€	  to	   prevent	   one	  minute	   of	   interruption.22	  Multiplying	   by	   the	   number	   of	   customers,	   the	  cost	   of	   avoiding	   one	   minute	   of	   interruption	   across	   all	   customers	   is	   estimated	   at	   5.5	  million	  €.	  	  	  Starting	   in	   2009,	   the	   French	   regulator	   put	   in	   place	   an	   incentive	   scheme	   for	   quality	   of	  electricity	  distribution.	  Any	  additional	  minute	  of	  interruption	  above	  (below)	  the	  quality	  threshold	   induces	  a	  penalty	   (reward).	  The	  penalty	   for	  an	  extra	  minute	  of	   interruption	  across	   all	   customers	   is	   set	   at	  4	  million	  €	   (3.89	  millions	  €	   if	   expressed	   in	  2005	  price),	  with	   the	   total	   penalty	   capped	   at	   50	   million	   €.	   Based	   on	   that,	   we	   estimate	   that	   the	  regulated	  (marginal)	  price	  of	  quality	  is	  equal	  to	  0.1264€	  per	  minute	  (in	  2005	  price).	  The	  estimated	  cost	  of	  quality	  (from	  our	  PLP	  results	  using	  sample	  data	  for	  the	  period	  2003-­‐05)	   is	   slightly	  higher	   than	   the	   regulated	  price	   (applicable	   as	   from	  2009).	   	   For	   the	  UK,	  Jamasb	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   estimate	   that	   the	   regulated	   price	   is	   (far)	   below	   the	   cost	   of	  increasing	  quality.	  	  Accordingly,	  such	  an	  incentive	  system	  fails	  to	  provide	  incentives	  for	  quality	  improvements.	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The	  shadow	  price	  of	  quality	  is	  not	  uniform	  across	  centres:	  the	  computed	  shadow	  price	  values	  vary	  from	  1.8€	  to	  69.2€.	  Shadow	  price	  levels	  mainly	  depend	  on	  the	  quality	  itself.	  More	  reliable	  networks	  tend	  to	  have	  a	  higher	  marginal	  cost	  of	  improving	  quality.	  This	  is	  nicely	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  2.	  The	  horizontal	  axis	  corresponds	  to	  quality	  (SAIFI)	  and	  the	  dots	  to	  the	  ERDF	  units	  (92	  Centres,	  average	  values	  over	  the	  three	  year	  period	  analysed).	  Thus,	  as	  one	  would	  expect,	  marginal	  quality	  improvements	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  expensive	  as	  a	   distribution	   network	   approaches	   100%	   reliability.	   Improving	   quality	   thus	   implies	   a	  convex	  cost	  relationship.	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  Note:	  Mean	  values	  by	  Centre	  over	  the	  2003	  to	  2005	  period.	  	  This	   is	   again	   apparent	   if	   one	   looks	   at	   the	   shadow	   prices	   of	   quality	   across	   quality	  quintiles	  in	  Table	  6.	  Low	  quality	  Centres	  (first	  quintile)	  have	  a	  shadow	  price	  of	  5.3€	  in	  OPEX	  price	  and	  of	  404.9€	  in	  Capital	  price,	  while	  those	  with	  high	  quality	  (fifth	  quintile)	  have	  higher	  shadow	  prices	  of	  26.9€	  and	  686.5€,	  respectively.	  	  	  	   Table	  6:	  Shadow	  price	  ratios	  (€	  2005	  prices)	  	  Quality	  	  quintiles	   Quality	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  OPEX	   Quality	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Capital	  Q1	   5.3	   404.9	  Q2	   8.5	   612.8	  Q3	   10.8	   717.3	  Q4	   13.1	   634.1	  Q5	   26.9	   686.5	  All	   10.7	   568.3	  	  Quality	  quintiles	  (SAIFI):	  1.9+	  (Q1);	  1.9-­‐1.5	  (Q2);	  1.5-­‐1.26	  (Q3);	  1.26-­‐1.0	  (Q4);	  1.0-­‐0.0	  (Q5).	  	  	  
7.	  CONCLUDING	  REMARKS	  	  Electricity	   distribution	   utilities	   are	   expected	   to	   provide	   power	   to	   customers	   24/24	  hours	  every	  day	  of	  the	  year.	  	  To	  prevent	  outages	  and	  their	  related	  costs	  operators	  have	  the	   possibility	   to	   increase	   either	   maintenance	   costs	   or	   to	   make	   new	   investments.	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Therefore,	   there	   is	   an	   implicit	   cost	   associated	   with	   customers’	   interruptions	   (and	  outages	  duration)	  in	  terms	  of	  operational	  costs	  (OPEX)	  and	  capital	  investments.	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  estimate	  the	  implicit	  cost	  of	  outages	  for	  the	  92	  DSO	  (Centres)	  of	  ERDF,	  the	  main	  distribution	  company	  in	  France,	  over	  the	  period	  2003-­‐05.	  For	  this	  purpose,	  we	  rely	   on	   a	   parametric	   distance	   function	   approach	   taking	   the	   number	   of	   customers’	  interruptions	  over	  a	  year	  as	  a	   third	   input	  variable	  (along	  with	  OPEX	  and	  capital).	  This	  approach	  allows	  us	  to	  estimate	  and	  to	  compare	  production	  performances	  and	  to	  have	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  underlying	  production	  technology.	  	  The	  production	  frontier	  provides	  information	  on	  the	  marginal	  rate	  of	  technical	  substitution	  between	  inputs	  (the	  shadow	   price),	   and	   we	   are	   particularly	   interested	   in	   the	   implicit	   price	   of	   quality	  improvement.	   	   In	  our	  estimate,	   the	  shadow	  price	  of	  quality	   in	  OPEX	  price	  ranges	   from	  1.8€	   to	   69.2€.	   	   	   And,	   as	   expected,	   the	   marginal	   cost	   of	   quality	   varies	   with	   quality	  delivered	  (SAIFI),	  implying	  convex	  costs	  of	  quality.	  	  	  	  Nowadays,	   electricity	   regulators	   introduce	   explicit	   reward	   and	   penalty	   scheme	   to	  regulate	   the	  quality	  of	   electricity	  distribution.	  The	   schemes	  aim	  at	  promoting	  efficient	  delivery	  of	   service	  quality	  by	   the	  DSOs.	   	   	   For	   that,	   it	   is	  of	  prime	   importance	   to	  have	  a	  precise	   knowledge	   of	   the	   underlying	   production	   technology.	   	   Indeed,	   the	   welfare	  maximizing	  level	  of	  service	  quality	  is	  such	  that	  the	  marginal	  benefit	  of	  quality	  is	  equal	  to	  the	   marginal	   cost	   (Sappington,	   2005).	   The	   consumer’s	   valuation	   of	   quality	   can	   be	  constructed	  by	  specifying	  a	  price	  for	  the	  electricity	  that	  it	  is	  not	  delivered	  (see	  Fumagalli	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  but	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  quality	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  assess.	  	  Thanks	  to	  a	  very	  comprehensive	  dataset,	  we	  provide	  an	  estimate	  of	  this	  marginal	  cost.	  	  	  	  As	  from	  2009,	  the	  French	  regulator	  introduced	  an	  explicit	  regulation	  of	  quality,	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  compare	  the	  regulated	  price	  of	  quality	  with	  its	  marginal	  cost	  to	  know	  whether	   the	   regulatory	   scheme	   in	   place	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   effective	   in	   promoting	   quality	  improvements	   (unlike	   the	  UK	  scheme	  according	   to	   Jamasb	  et	   al.,	   2010).	   	  According	   to	  our	  estimates,	  the	  average	  shadow	  price	  for	  the	  period	  2003-­‐05,	  was	  33%	  higher	  than	  the	   regulated	   price	   in	   2009.	   	   But,	   to	   compare	   the	   like	   with	   the	   like,	   it	   would	   be	  interesting	  to	  replicate	  our	  methodology	  with	  more	  recent	  data.	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  1	  O’Donnell	   and	   Coelli	   (2005)	   proposed	   a	   Bayesian	   approach	   which	   also	   allows	   imposing	   regularity	  conditions	   on	  distance	   function	   estimations.	  Other	   than	   the	  difficulties,	   in	   terms	  of	   statistical	   skills	   and	  computational	   challenges,	   implied	   by	   the	   Bayesian	   approach,	   the	   deterministic	   PLP	   approach	   is	  appropriate	  when	  data	  is	  of	  high	  quality;	  at	  it	  is	  the	  case	  of	  the	  homogeneous	  information	  on	  ERDF	  units	  studied	  here.	  
2	  This	   is	   also	   seen	   in	   a	   DEA	   study	   by	   Korhonen	   and	   Syrjänen	   (2003)	   of	   Finnish	   electricity	   distribution	  operators,	   where	   the	   inclusion	   of	   a	   TINT	   variable	   into	   the	   DEA	   model	   led	   to	   increases	   in	   technical	  efficiency	  for	  a	  number	  of	  firms.	  For	  example,	  see	  their	  Figure	  3.	  However,	  note	  that	  these	  results	  need	  to	  be	  treated	  with	  caution	  because	  their	  DEA	  model	  did	  not	   include	  a	  capital	  measure,	  which	  could	  lead	  to	  substantial	  biases.	  
3	  In	  a	  previous	  study,	  Coelli	  et	  al	  (2007),	  we	  used	  an	  earlier	  version	  of	  this	  data	  set	  to	  conduct	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  SFA	  and	  data	  envelopment	  analysis	  (DEA)	  approaches.	  
4	  Competition	  for	  concession	  contracts	  is	  not	  yet	  possible.	  	  	  
5	  See	  Fumagalli	  et	  al.	  (2007).	  	  
6	  System	  Average	  Interruption	  Frequency	  Index	  (SAIFI)	  and	  System	  Average	  Interruption	  Duration	  Index	  (SAIDI)	   indicate	   the	  average	  number	  and	  the	  average	  duration	  of	   interruptions	  (longer	   than	  3	  minutes)	  experienced	  by	  customer	  served	  per	  year,	  respectively.	  
7	  Note	  that	  in	  our	  application	  we	  have	  annual	  data	  on	  92	  units	  over	  a	  three	  years	  period.	  	  Hence	  we	  have	  276	  observations.	  Given	  the	  short	  time	  period	  we	  assume	  that	  there	  has	  been	  no	  technological	  progress	  over	  this	  period	  and	  hence	  pool	  the	  data	  as	  if	  it	  was	  a	  single	  year	  of	  data	  on	  276	  firms	  when	  estimating	  the	  production	  frontiers.	  
8	  Assuming	  that	  improving	  quality	  requires	  a	  proportional	  increases	  in	  the	  other	  inputs.	  Otherwise,	  under	  a	  non-­‐radial	  (directional)	  distance	  function	  setting,	  the	  shadow	  price	  of	  quality	  would	  be	  lower.	  We	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  one	  of	  the	  reviewers	  for	  drawing	  our	  attention	  to	  this	  point.	  
32	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  See	   O’Donnell	   and	   Coelli	   (2005)	   for	   an	   application	   of	   a	   Bayesian	   approach	   to	   impose	   regularity	  conditions.	  	  
10	  Imposing	  monotonicity	   restrictions	   at	   each	  point	   (locally)	   on	  PLP	   computations	  we	   follow	  Färe	   et	   al.	  (1993).	   However,	   on	   the	   contrary	   of	   these	   authors	   who	   imposed	   restrictions	   on	   selected	   outputs,	   we	  impose	   monotonicity	   on	   all	   distance	   function	   derivatives	   simultaneously.	   	   For	   more	   details	   on	   PLP	  computations,	  see	  Coelli	  and	  Perelman	  (1999).	  
11	  We	  would	  prefer	   to	  use	  net	  electricity	  delivered	  as	  output	   instead	  of	  gross	  electricity	  distributed,	  but	  information	  on	  losses	  was	  not	  available	  for	  the	  whole	  sample.	  
12	  The	  gross	   capital	   value	   is	   computed	  by	  ERDF	  using	   replacement	  values,	  with	   the	  exception	  of	   capital	  materials	  that	  have	  reached	  the	  end	  of	  their	  depreciation	  period	  (expected	  potential	  service	  life),	  in	  which	  case	  the	  gross	  purchase	  value	  is	  only	  adjusted	  for	  inflation.	  	  
13	  The	   alternative	   would	   have	   been	   to	   introduce	   the	   environmental	   factors	   as	   determinants	   of	   the	  technical	  efficiency	  but	  this	  can	  only	  be	  done	   in	  the	  SFA	  model.	   	  The	  advantage	  of	  an	  empirical	  strategy	  based	  on	  an	  extended	  distance	  function	  is	  that	  two	  more	  comparable	  models	  can	  be	  estimated	  as	  both	  SFA	  and	  PLP	  distance	  functions	  include	  the	  same	  set	  of	  explanatory	  variables.	  	  	  
14	  But	  capital	  per	  customer	  (CAP/CUST)	  diminishes	  with	  consumer	  density.	  	  	  	  
15	  These	   observations	  might	   be	   seen	   as	   indicating	   that	   costs	   are	  mainly	   driven	   by	   the	   level	   of	   outages.	  	  However,	   the	   distance	   function	   estimates	   presented	   later	   show	   that	   it	   is	   dangerous	   to	   look	   at	   a	   few	  measures	   in	   isolation,	   and	   that	   the	   relationships	   are	   much	   more	   complex.	   The	   direction	   and	   the	  importance	   of	   these	   relations	   will	   depend,	   among	   others,	   on	   the	   complementarity/substitutability	  between	  OPEX,	  capital	  investments	  and	  quality.	  
16	  Results	   are	   insensitive	   to	   the	   choice	   of	   the	   reference	   variable,	   as	   illustrated	   in	   Coelli	   and	   Perelman	  (1996).	  	  	  	  
17	  Note	   that	   the	   PLP	  model	   satisfies	   curvature	   conditions	   in	  most	   points.	   The	   estimated	   input	   distance	  function	  (1)	  satisfies	  quasi-­‐convexity	  in	  inputs	  at	  all	  points	  and	  convexity	  on	  outputs	  on	  179/276	  points.	  	  	  
18	  The	  distance	  measures	  derived	  from	  the	  estimation	  of	  input	  distance	  functions	  are,	  by	  definition,	  equal	  or	  higher	   than	  1.0.	   For	  presentation	  purposes,	  we	   transform	   them	   into	   technical	   efficiency	   scores,	  with	  values	  between	  0	  and	  1.0,	  by	  taking	  the	  reciprocal.	  
19	  For	  each	  observation,	  there	  are	  6	  monotonicity	  constraints	  to	  be	  satisfied.	  	  In	  the	  SFA	  estimation,	  11.1%	  of	   these	   constraints	   are	   violated	   and,	   for	   more	   than	   half	   (58.0%)	   of	   the	   observations,	   at	   least	   one	  constraint	  is	  not	  satisfied.	  	   	  Mainly	  two	  variables	  are	  concerned:	  on	  the	  output	  side	  GWH	  (y3)	  and	  on	  the	  
33	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  input	  side	  NINT	  (x3),	  the	  two	  variables	  for	  which	  the	  distance	  function	  elasticities	  are	  small	  (close	  to	  zero)	  at	  average	  values.	  	  
20	  Under	  the	  SFA	  model,	  average	  scale	  elasticity	  also	  corresponds	  to	  increasing	  returns	  to	  scale	  (e=-­‐0.961).	  PLP	  results	  are	  however	  preferred	  as	  partial	  elasticities	  measured	  at	  each	  point	  satisfy	  the	  monotonicity	  conditions.	  
21	  This	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  PLP	  model	  remains	  flexible	  despite	  the	  monotonicity	  constraints.	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Using	   a	   different	  methodology,	   Jamasb	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   estimate	   that	   the	   average	   cost	   of	   one	  minute	   of	  interruption	  is	  equal	  to	  0.251£	  in	  the	  UK	  for	  the	  period	  1995-­‐2002.	  	  	  
